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Open Submission to the Dalhousie University Project on Hydraulic Fracturing by David Wheeler
Quote from Steve MacLellan on April 22, 2026, 1:00 pm
Barbara Harris of NoFrac wrote David Wheeler wrote a blistering critique of the Province-Dal project to promote fracking for gas. Well worth a read, and maybe could be used if you are going to one of the "public engagement" sessions today or tomorrow. Here is what he posted on LinkedIn:
David Wheeler
April 20, 2026Introduction
As a former Dean of Management (2006-2019) and subsequent chair of the Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing (2013-2014) I am writing to express my profound disappointment in Dalhousie University as an institution agreeing to accept a C$30 million commission from the Province of Nova Scotia to fast track studies on the engineering and geological feasibility of hydraulic fracturing.[i]
I read the original 22nd December 2025 joint statement by the Government of Nova Scotia and Dalhousie University: Subsurface Energy R&D Investment Program which made a political case for the project, and which was based on a shocking lack of scientific objectivity.
And I have read the agreementsigned between the Province and Dalhousie University which makes clear the entirely commercial nature of the transaction.
I note that:
i) This project is commissioned research, covered by confidentiality clauses and with publication of results contingent on approval by the Province. This is clearly not objective academic research where the contracted institution is at liberty to freely share the results of its research.
ii) There is a clear intent in the agreement to generate knowledge on the potential value of subsurface hydrocarbon resources with Dalhousie University responsible for the selection and subsequent incentive payment of engineering contractors who may apparently go on to explore or fully develop the resource (or both).
iii) Top level stakeholder engagement and local baseline studies are to be conducted in parallel with exploration, rather than prior, which will inevitably lead to distrust and opposition as communities will rightly see this as establishing a fast track to full scale exploration.
Thus I believe that the role accepted by Dalhousie University places it in a position of significant potential financial and reputational liability e.g. in the event of environmental, social or economic harms caused by contractors, and in clear breach of its stated commitments to Reconciliation.
Current Context and Considerations
As a highly valued member of the 2013-14 Independent Review Panel, and the institutional lead on this project, Professor Gagnon will recall the detail of our work and indeed the significant amount of community engagement and baseline research that all panel members believed would be essential before any new exploratory drilling could even be contemplated. The details are provided below in my summary of the process we followed and the recommendations we made unanimously at the time, in case they have been forgotten.
It is my view that the recommendations we made in 2014 are still relevant today. I am not aware of any significant scientific or engineering advances that would materially affect the risk matrix we established through exhaustive literature reviews and debate within our panel, with the principal exception of climate impacts which have become significantly more evident in the years since 2014. Minor improvements in drilling efficiency or water use do not affect the potential for serious environmental, social and public health risks arising through accidents or other failures caused by drilling contractors.
Below I describe the process we followed in 2013-14, simply to demonstrate the care we took to act with integrity at all times and to accord full respect to stakeholder opinion, scientific evidence, and of course Indigenous knowledge and rights.
Based on my reading of the current contract, it is hard for me to see the same seriousness and integrity reflected in the project taken on by Dalhousie University, especially considering the very aggressive timelines envisaged. The project appears to be a partisan, politically inspired attempt to fast track knowledge concerning the potential for unconventional resource extraction (a major unknown in 2014 and still unproven in 2026). Meanwhile Dalhousie University will be crashing through public opinion and community objections with stakeholder outreach which appears at best to be superficial and at worst to risk serious conflict when engineering contractors show up in drilling locations with no social licence to operate.
I note the clearly stated objections of the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia and the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi'kmaw Chiefs to the prospect of hydraulic fracturing. Their principled stance should be enough for Dalhousie University to immediately suspend the project based on its own institutional commitments to Reconciliation, regardless of whatever the Province of Nova Scotia may or may not do under its legal and constitutional obligations. Our panel dealt with these issues in great detail, thanks to the expertise of Professor Constance MacIntosh of the Dalhousie University Law School.
I would therefore urge the Board of Governors and the President of Dalhousie University to reflect deeply on the serious – and some might say reckless - institutional risks they are accepting in allowing this project to proceed. There will undoubtedly be commercial, engineering, environmental and reputational liabilities incurred in this project that no amount of short term goodwill and financial investment from the current Government of Nova Scotia will compensate. Is this really the legacy you want?
I would urge the faculty of Dalhousie University to carefully compare the ethical operating principles followed by the 2013-14 review (see below) with any principles which the current project cares to share in due course. And I would ask you to debate at the University Senate whether any political and commercial advantage gained by this project outweighs principles of academic independence and integrity that universities are supposed to represent. Exactly what kind of institution do you want Dalhousie University to be?
I would urge the students and alumni of Dalhousie University to campaign actively to protect the value of their degrees, and the degrees of future students which could be compromised by their university being actively and practically involved in advancing the interests of the fossil fuel industry in Nova Scotia, bypassing Indigenous rights and contributing to the climate crisis. Are these the practices and values you wish your degree to be associated with?
Finally, I would urge all Nova Scotians, and especially those living in communities who may be directly affected by these engineering experiments to speak out as clearly and as forcefully as you did in 2013-14. The careful recommendations my panel made in our report (reproduced below) were designed to protect your health, your environment and your rights. This is why we proposed serious baseline studies before any new wells were drilled and a power of veto (via a ‘community permission to proceed’) for communities that are not convinced that hydraulic fracturing should proceed in their area.
The History and Principles of the 2013-14 Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing
In summer 2013, Deputy Minister of Energy Murray Coolican asked me whether I would be open to conducting an independent study on whether hydraulic fracturing could ever be done safely in Nova Scotia.
I had overseen previous energy policy related studies when I was Dean of Management at Dalhousie University. These processes led to the establishment of Efficiency Nova Scotia in 2009 and the Nova Scotia Renewable Electricity Strategy in 2010. They were deemed to have been successful at the time and have proven so since, demonstrating the value of cross-party, stakeholder-inclusive processes in establishing good public policy. These processes were fully described in two detailed reports to government, Hansard Archives from the Nova Scotia legislature, and a peer-reviewed publication.[ii]
Given the highly polarised nature of the debate on hydraulic fracturing in Nova Scotia and internationally at the time, I agreed it was an important piece of research and agreed to take on the project.
As in previous exercises undertaken for the Province I insisted on complete independence and academic freedom in conducting the process and the ability to speak openly with stakeholders and the media throughout. Just to reinforce this point I did not accept any personal remuneration as I deemed it my duty as a public servant (by then employed by Cape Breton University) to run the process solely in the public interest.
A rigorous and comprehensive process was run, overseen by an independently nominated panel of ten experts representing all social, health, environmental, legal, technical, engineering and economic considerations relevant to hydraulic fracturing, including Indigenous wisdom.
Our review had six clear ethical principles:
1). No preconceptions: Panel members agreed to abide by a Code of Conduct and no assumptions were made regarding the final outcome of the review process.
2). Legitimacy of all views: All public commentary and all submissions received by the Panel were accepted as legitimate, except on rare occasions when commentary was rude or disrespectful.
3). Transparency: A public record of all formal submissions received by the Panel was made available, minutes of meetings were published,13 public meetings were held and the Panel Chair was accessible for all media inquiries.
4). Evidence based: Relevant scientific, technical and other literature was scrutinised and summarised throughout the review. Technical expert advice was sought and considered as well as evidence provided by stakeholders.
5). Interdisciplinarity: Panel members acknowledged the different worldviews, disciplines and experience of the other panel members yet were able to collaborate effectively during panel deliberations, writing and drafting of recommendations.
6). Precautionary approach: Principle15 of the final declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development was applied during the review: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” (United Nations,1992).[iii]
Consistent with the two earlier studies, the ten steps we followed to involve stakeholders and experts in the delivery of robust public policy were:
1) Identification and inclusion of stakeholders.
2) Establishment of cognitive baseline with stakeholders (agreement of principles, goals and objectives).
3) Development of plausible scenarios.
4) Elaboration of scenarios through expert presentations and commissioned papers.
5) Iterative discussion of all of the above through a number of formal dialogue sessions.
6) Independent assessment of stakeholder trust in process and developing recommendations (opinion surveys conducted after each formal dialogue session).
7) Continuous solicitation of written and other submissions.
8) Presentation of draft policy recommendations back to stakeholders.
9) Presentation of policy recommendations to government.
10) Enactment of policy recommendations by government.
Thus, the process involved:
· Two preliminary informational public meetings
· The preparation and release of 10 discussion papers
· Convening three online discussion forums
· Hosting 11 public meetings across the province on preliminary findings and recommendations, attended by more than 1000 people.
· The preparation and submission of a final report to the Province
When our 387 page[iv]reportwas published in September 2014, it carried the support of every member of our advisory panel, despite their very disparate backgrounds and perspectives. The report was welcomed by stakeholders and generally well received by the media.
Based on exhaustive evaluation of the risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing as they may relate to Nova Scotia, the principal recommendations in the report were:
1) A significant period of learning and dialogue is now required at both provincial and community levels, and thus hydraulic fracturing for the purpose of unconventional gas and oil development should not proceed at the present time in Nova Scotia.
Independently conducted research of a scientific and public participatory nature is required to model economic, social, environmental, and community health impacts of all forms of energy production and use – including any prospect of unconventional gas and oil development in Nova Scotia – at both provincial and community levels.
Nova Scotia should design and recognize the test of a community permission to proceed before exploration occurs for the purpose of using hydraulic fracturing in the development of unconventional gas and oil resources.
2) If new knowledge persuades communities to welcome the prospect of examining the potential benefits and costs of developing unconventional gas and oil resources then seismic testing for the purpose of pursuing exploration using hydraulic fracturing would proceed only when full, prior, and informed community consent was established and comprehensive baseline health, socioeconomic, socio-ecological, and environmental monitoring and regulatory protections were in place.
3) If new knowledge persuades communities to welcome the prospect of developing unconventional gas and oil resources through the application of hydraulic fracturing techniques then there would be a need to design and establish:
• Comprehensive baseline monitoring, ongoing monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement regimes;
• Rigorous health, social and environmental impact assessments – including economic assessments of direct and indirect costs and benefits and externalities and site-specific geological assessments, prior resource extraction activities etc.;
• A detailed life cycle assessment of the potential positive and negative climate change impacts of developing an unconventional gas and oil industry in Nova Scotia;
• Specific risk reduction and benefit sharing systems by identified population and community;
• Participatory planning and adaptive management frameworks, including for socio-economic and social-ecological aspects;
• Bond and insurance protections in the event of damage ever being caused to people, fauna, flora, or the environment.
We summarised our conclusions in apeer reviewed article for Energy Policy[v] thus:
The Panel concluded that the Province of Nova Scotia was not ready to embrace hydraulic fracturing, primarily because of the absence of trust in industry and government and the lack of a geographically grounded social licence. Further geographically specific research would be needed on all likely impacts of the development of unconventional gas and oil, particularly with respect to better identifying and quantifying benefits and costs to particular communities that might be impacted.
Based on fuller knowledge of how predicted benefits and costs would play out over the short, medium and long term, the Panel believed that communities would be in a better position to judge the acceptability to them – or otherwise – of any future unconventional gas and oil development in their immediate environment. The Panel reinforced this by recommending that the provincial government develop a ‘community permission to proceed’ mechanism, consistent with Sandman's (1987) principles of voluntariness (self-imposed risk), control (personally managed risk) and fairness (equitably distributed risk).
The report detailed 32 additional recommendations that would become relevant if the Province and its Aboriginal communities and municipalities decided to pursue the technology.
David Wheeler PhD
19th April 2026
[i] Province of Nova Scotia (2026). Subsurface Energy R&D Investment Program Agreement. Available via: https://novascotia.ca/onshore-natural-gas/docs/Subsurface-Energy-RD-Investment-Program-Agreement.pdf
[ii] Adams M, Wheeler D and Woolston G (2011). A Participatory Approach to Sustainable Energy Strategy Development in a Carbon-Intensive Jurisdiction: Case of Nova Scotia. Energy Policy 39, 2550–2559.
[iii] United Nations (1992) United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Available via: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio1992
[iv] Atherton et al., (2014). Report of the Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing. Cape Breton University. Available via: https://energy.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Nova%20Scotia%20Independent%20Panel%20on%20Hydraulic%20Fracturing.pdf
[v] Wheeler D, MacGregor M, Atherton F, Christmas C, Dalton S, Dusseault M, Gagnon G, Hayes B, MacIntosh C, Mauro I and Ritcey R (2015). Hydraulic fracturing - integrating public participation with an independent review of the risks and benefits. Energy Policy 85, 299–308.
Barbara Harris of NoFrac wrote David Wheeler wrote a blistering critique of the Province-Dal project to promote fracking for gas. Well worth a read, and maybe could be used if you are going to one of the "public engagement" sessions today or tomorrow. Here is what he posted on LinkedIn:
David Wheeler
Introduction
As a former Dean of Management (2006-2019) and subsequent chair of the Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing (2013-2014) I am writing to express my profound disappointment in Dalhousie University as an institution agreeing to accept a C$30 million commission from the Province of Nova Scotia to fast track studies on the engineering and geological feasibility of hydraulic fracturing.[i]
I read the original 22nd December 2025 joint statement by the Government of Nova Scotia and Dalhousie University: Subsurface Energy R&D Investment Program which made a political case for the project, and which was based on a shocking lack of scientific objectivity.
And I have read the agreementsigned between the Province and Dalhousie University which makes clear the entirely commercial nature of the transaction.
I note that:
i) This project is commissioned research, covered by confidentiality clauses and with publication of results contingent on approval by the Province. This is clearly not objective academic research where the contracted institution is at liberty to freely share the results of its research.
ii) There is a clear intent in the agreement to generate knowledge on the potential value of subsurface hydrocarbon resources with Dalhousie University responsible for the selection and subsequent incentive payment of engineering contractors who may apparently go on to explore or fully develop the resource (or both).
iii) Top level stakeholder engagement and local baseline studies are to be conducted in parallel with exploration, rather than prior, which will inevitably lead to distrust and opposition as communities will rightly see this as establishing a fast track to full scale exploration.
Thus I believe that the role accepted by Dalhousie University places it in a position of significant potential financial and reputational liability e.g. in the event of environmental, social or economic harms caused by contractors, and in clear breach of its stated commitments to Reconciliation.
Current Context and Considerations
As a highly valued member of the 2013-14 Independent Review Panel, and the institutional lead on this project, Professor Gagnon will recall the detail of our work and indeed the significant amount of community engagement and baseline research that all panel members believed would be essential before any new exploratory drilling could even be contemplated. The details are provided below in my summary of the process we followed and the recommendations we made unanimously at the time, in case they have been forgotten.
It is my view that the recommendations we made in 2014 are still relevant today. I am not aware of any significant scientific or engineering advances that would materially affect the risk matrix we established through exhaustive literature reviews and debate within our panel, with the principal exception of climate impacts which have become significantly more evident in the years since 2014. Minor improvements in drilling efficiency or water use do not affect the potential for serious environmental, social and public health risks arising through accidents or other failures caused by drilling contractors.
Below I describe the process we followed in 2013-14, simply to demonstrate the care we took to act with integrity at all times and to accord full respect to stakeholder opinion, scientific evidence, and of course Indigenous knowledge and rights.
Based on my reading of the current contract, it is hard for me to see the same seriousness and integrity reflected in the project taken on by Dalhousie University, especially considering the very aggressive timelines envisaged. The project appears to be a partisan, politically inspired attempt to fast track knowledge concerning the potential for unconventional resource extraction (a major unknown in 2014 and still unproven in 2026). Meanwhile Dalhousie University will be crashing through public opinion and community objections with stakeholder outreach which appears at best to be superficial and at worst to risk serious conflict when engineering contractors show up in drilling locations with no social licence to operate.
I note the clearly stated objections of the Mi'kmaq of Nova Scotia and the Assembly of Nova Scotia Mi'kmaw Chiefs to the prospect of hydraulic fracturing. Their principled stance should be enough for Dalhousie University to immediately suspend the project based on its own institutional commitments to Reconciliation, regardless of whatever the Province of Nova Scotia may or may not do under its legal and constitutional obligations. Our panel dealt with these issues in great detail, thanks to the expertise of Professor Constance MacIntosh of the Dalhousie University Law School.
I would therefore urge the Board of Governors and the President of Dalhousie University to reflect deeply on the serious – and some might say reckless - institutional risks they are accepting in allowing this project to proceed. There will undoubtedly be commercial, engineering, environmental and reputational liabilities incurred in this project that no amount of short term goodwill and financial investment from the current Government of Nova Scotia will compensate. Is this really the legacy you want?
I would urge the faculty of Dalhousie University to carefully compare the ethical operating principles followed by the 2013-14 review (see below) with any principles which the current project cares to share in due course. And I would ask you to debate at the University Senate whether any political and commercial advantage gained by this project outweighs principles of academic independence and integrity that universities are supposed to represent. Exactly what kind of institution do you want Dalhousie University to be?
I would urge the students and alumni of Dalhousie University to campaign actively to protect the value of their degrees, and the degrees of future students which could be compromised by their university being actively and practically involved in advancing the interests of the fossil fuel industry in Nova Scotia, bypassing Indigenous rights and contributing to the climate crisis. Are these the practices and values you wish your degree to be associated with?
Finally, I would urge all Nova Scotians, and especially those living in communities who may be directly affected by these engineering experiments to speak out as clearly and as forcefully as you did in 2013-14. The careful recommendations my panel made in our report (reproduced below) were designed to protect your health, your environment and your rights. This is why we proposed serious baseline studies before any new wells were drilled and a power of veto (via a ‘community permission to proceed’) for communities that are not convinced that hydraulic fracturing should proceed in their area.
The History and Principles of the 2013-14 Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing
In summer 2013, Deputy Minister of Energy Murray Coolican asked me whether I would be open to conducting an independent study on whether hydraulic fracturing could ever be done safely in Nova Scotia.
I had overseen previous energy policy related studies when I was Dean of Management at Dalhousie University. These processes led to the establishment of Efficiency Nova Scotia in 2009 and the Nova Scotia Renewable Electricity Strategy in 2010. They were deemed to have been successful at the time and have proven so since, demonstrating the value of cross-party, stakeholder-inclusive processes in establishing good public policy. These processes were fully described in two detailed reports to government, Hansard Archives from the Nova Scotia legislature, and a peer-reviewed publication.[ii]
Given the highly polarised nature of the debate on hydraulic fracturing in Nova Scotia and internationally at the time, I agreed it was an important piece of research and agreed to take on the project.
As in previous exercises undertaken for the Province I insisted on complete independence and academic freedom in conducting the process and the ability to speak openly with stakeholders and the media throughout. Just to reinforce this point I did not accept any personal remuneration as I deemed it my duty as a public servant (by then employed by Cape Breton University) to run the process solely in the public interest.
A rigorous and comprehensive process was run, overseen by an independently nominated panel of ten experts representing all social, health, environmental, legal, technical, engineering and economic considerations relevant to hydraulic fracturing, including Indigenous wisdom.
Our review had six clear ethical principles:
1). No preconceptions: Panel members agreed to abide by a Code of Conduct and no assumptions were made regarding the final outcome of the review process.
2). Legitimacy of all views: All public commentary and all submissions received by the Panel were accepted as legitimate, except on rare occasions when commentary was rude or disrespectful.
3). Transparency: A public record of all formal submissions received by the Panel was made available, minutes of meetings were published,13 public meetings were held and the Panel Chair was accessible for all media inquiries.
4). Evidence based: Relevant scientific, technical and other literature was scrutinised and summarised throughout the review. Technical expert advice was sought and considered as well as evidence provided by stakeholders.
5). Interdisciplinarity: Panel members acknowledged the different worldviews, disciplines and experience of the other panel members yet were able to collaborate effectively during panel deliberations, writing and drafting of recommendations.
6). Precautionary approach: Principle15 of the final declaration of the UN Conference on Environment and Development was applied during the review: “where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” (United Nations,1992).[iii]
Consistent with the two earlier studies, the ten steps we followed to involve stakeholders and experts in the delivery of robust public policy were:
1) Identification and inclusion of stakeholders.
2) Establishment of cognitive baseline with stakeholders (agreement of principles, goals and objectives).
3) Development of plausible scenarios.
4) Elaboration of scenarios through expert presentations and commissioned papers.
5) Iterative discussion of all of the above through a number of formal dialogue sessions.
6) Independent assessment of stakeholder trust in process and developing recommendations (opinion surveys conducted after each formal dialogue session).
7) Continuous solicitation of written and other submissions.
8) Presentation of draft policy recommendations back to stakeholders.
9) Presentation of policy recommendations to government.
10) Enactment of policy recommendations by government.
Thus, the process involved:
· Two preliminary informational public meetings
· The preparation and release of 10 discussion papers
· Convening three online discussion forums
· Hosting 11 public meetings across the province on preliminary findings and recommendations, attended by more than 1000 people.
· The preparation and submission of a final report to the Province
When our 387 page[iv]reportwas published in September 2014, it carried the support of every member of our advisory panel, despite their very disparate backgrounds and perspectives. The report was welcomed by stakeholders and generally well received by the media.
Based on exhaustive evaluation of the risks and benefits of hydraulic fracturing as they may relate to Nova Scotia, the principal recommendations in the report were:
1) A significant period of learning and dialogue is now required at both provincial and community levels, and thus hydraulic fracturing for the purpose of unconventional gas and oil development should not proceed at the present time in Nova Scotia.
Independently conducted research of a scientific and public participatory nature is required to model economic, social, environmental, and community health impacts of all forms of energy production and use – including any prospect of unconventional gas and oil development in Nova Scotia – at both provincial and community levels.
Nova Scotia should design and recognize the test of a community permission to proceed before exploration occurs for the purpose of using hydraulic fracturing in the development of unconventional gas and oil resources.
2) If new knowledge persuades communities to welcome the prospect of examining the potential benefits and costs of developing unconventional gas and oil resources then seismic testing for the purpose of pursuing exploration using hydraulic fracturing would proceed only when full, prior, and informed community consent was established and comprehensive baseline health, socioeconomic, socio-ecological, and environmental monitoring and regulatory protections were in place.
3) If new knowledge persuades communities to welcome the prospect of developing unconventional gas and oil resources through the application of hydraulic fracturing techniques then there would be a need to design and establish:
• Comprehensive baseline monitoring, ongoing monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement regimes;
• Rigorous health, social and environmental impact assessments – including economic assessments of direct and indirect costs and benefits and externalities and site-specific geological assessments, prior resource extraction activities etc.;
• A detailed life cycle assessment of the potential positive and negative climate change impacts of developing an unconventional gas and oil industry in Nova Scotia;
• Specific risk reduction and benefit sharing systems by identified population and community;
• Participatory planning and adaptive management frameworks, including for socio-economic and social-ecological aspects;
• Bond and insurance protections in the event of damage ever being caused to people, fauna, flora, or the environment.
We summarised our conclusions in apeer reviewed article for Energy Policy[v] thus:
The Panel concluded that the Province of Nova Scotia was not ready to embrace hydraulic fracturing, primarily because of the absence of trust in industry and government and the lack of a geographically grounded social licence. Further geographically specific research would be needed on all likely impacts of the development of unconventional gas and oil, particularly with respect to better identifying and quantifying benefits and costs to particular communities that might be impacted.
Based on fuller knowledge of how predicted benefits and costs would play out over the short, medium and long term, the Panel believed that communities would be in a better position to judge the acceptability to them – or otherwise – of any future unconventional gas and oil development in their immediate environment. The Panel reinforced this by recommending that the provincial government develop a ‘community permission to proceed’ mechanism, consistent with Sandman's (1987) principles of voluntariness (self-imposed risk), control (personally managed risk) and fairness (equitably distributed risk).
The report detailed 32 additional recommendations that would become relevant if the Province and its Aboriginal communities and municipalities decided to pursue the technology.
David Wheeler PhD
19th April 2026
[i] Province of Nova Scotia (2026). Subsurface Energy R&D Investment Program Agreement. Available via: https://novascotia.ca/onshore-natural-gas/docs/Subsurface-Energy-RD-Investment-Program-Agreement.pdf
[ii] Adams M, Wheeler D and Woolston G (2011). A Participatory Approach to Sustainable Energy Strategy Development in a Carbon-Intensive Jurisdiction: Case of Nova Scotia. Energy Policy 39, 2550–2559.
[iii] United Nations (1992) United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Available via: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/environment/rio1992
[iv] Atherton et al., (2014). Report of the Nova Scotia Independent Review Panel on Hydraulic Fracturing. Cape Breton University. Available via: https://energy.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Report%20of%20the%20Nova%20Scotia%20Independent%20Panel%20on%20Hydraulic%20Fracturing.pdf
[v] Wheeler D, MacGregor M, Atherton F, Christmas C, Dalton S, Dusseault M, Gagnon G, Hayes B, MacIntosh C, Mauro I and Ritcey R (2015). Hydraulic fracturing - integrating public participation with an independent review of the risks and benefits. Energy Policy 85, 299–308.